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ABSlUACT 
The anonymous interaction of large numbers of economic agents 
is a kind of noncooperative situation which is markedly different from 
small-numbers strategic conflict. The mathematical model of a 
nonatomic game, or a game with a continuum of players. has been 
introduced as a model for these many-agent situations on the basis 
that its equilibria should closely approximate those of games with 
large finite numbers of players. This paper contains a precise 
definition of what it means for a nonatomic game to be the limit of a 
sequence of finite-player games. and a theorem which states when the 
limit of equilibria of finite-player games will be an equilibrium of 
the nonatomic limit game. This is analogous to theorems prompted by 
Edgeworth's conjecture in core theory. It is derived from a general 
set of sufficient conditions for the graph of a noncooperative 
equilibrium correspondence to be closed. 
CONTINUUM AND FINITE-PLAYER NONCOOPERATIVE :&IODELS OF COUPETITION 
Edward I. Green• 
1 • INTRODUCTION 
Noncooperative game theory is an attempt to explain and 
anal yze behavior in two kinds of situations which are markedl y 
different from one another. The first kind of situation consists of 
confl icts among a smal l group of agents, each of whom can make 
unil ateral decisions which may significantl y affect the welfare of the 
others as wel l as his own wel fare. Card games with high stakes and 
battl es between opposing general s are canonical exampl es of such 
confl ict. The second kind of situation is characterized by the 
individual istic but not del iberatel y adversary behavior of a l arge 
number of agents, none of whom alone is abl e to affect the 
circumstances of anyone except himsel f but whose actions in the 
aggregate determine the environment in which al l must l ive. The 
canonical exampl es of this l atter sort of anonymous interaction are, 
of course, competitive markets. 
Noncooperative game theory has been l argel y a theory of games 
having a fixed finite set of pl ayers. Regardl ess of its suitabil ity 
for the representation of smal l -numbers confl ict, this emphasis on 
enucerating al l the pl ayers and their actions, one by one, makes the 
study of anony mous individual istic behavior awkward. Microeconomics 
is ful l of el egant and persuasive arguments about the behavior of 
representative firms and representative consumers in competitive 
markets in general , but it is an ambitious project to use finite­
pl ayer games to show that a simpl e model of noncooperative exchange 
yiel ds competitive outcomes when there are many traders (cf. [10]). 
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There is another representation of noncooperative games which 
is much more suitabl e than the finite-pl ayer representation as a basis 
for competitive theory. This is Schmeidl er's [12] model of an 
anonymous noncooperative strategic-form game with a nonatomic measure 
space of pl ayers, which is a noncooperative anal ogue of the nonatomic 
model of the core of an exchange economy due to Aumann [1] • Just as 
Aumann's model provides a formal setting in which the core and the 
Wal ras equil ibrium set exactl y coincide, so Schmeidl er's model 
provides a setting in which Wal ras equil ibrium coincides with 
noncooperative equil ibrium for a fairl y wide cl ass of games (cf. [3]). 
Moreover, it can be shown in this setting that the objections which 
may be brought against strategic form as a representation of smal l ­
numbers confl ict are irrel evant to competitive situations (cf. [5]). 
Thus Schmeidl er's model appears to be an excel l ent foundation for 
competitive theory. 
There is a probl em about the use of Schmeidl er's model ,  
though, which is that the noncooperative anal ogue of Edgeworth's 
conjecture may fail.  Sequences of l arger and l arger finite games can 
be constructed such tl1at (a) these sequence; intuitively have l imits 
which are nonatomic ganes having onl y Wal rasian noncooperative 
equil ibriun al l ocations but (b) there are sequences of noncooperative 
equil ibriuc al l ocations of the finite games which converge to highl y 
noncompetitive allocations in the limit (cf. [5, 11) ). Given this 
phenomenon of "discontinuity at infinity," the assumption of a 
continuum of players might be suspect. Fortunately, however, the 
phenomenon is limited in scope. For particul ar classes of games, 
Dubey, Mas-Colell and Shubik [3) and G reen [5] have shown that there 
are conditions under which the equilibria of a sequence of games in 
which a finite set of players is replicated will converge to 
equil ibria of the nonatomic limit game. General theorems about this 
convergence of equilibria are set forth in the present paper. The 
i1:U11ediate purpose of these theorems is to provide widely applicable 
and easily understandable and verifiable criteria for when a 
noncooperative model of competition may appropriately be studied in 
the continuum-of-players setting. 
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This work on convergence of equilibria will closely parallel 
the study of the corresponding problem in core theory. In particular, 
two devices which originated in that study will be adapted to 
noncooperativc equilibrium here. One of these is the restatement of 
the original problem of convergence as a question about the upper 
hemicontinuity of an equil ibrium correspondence defined on a 
topological space of games. This formulation is due to Kannai [8] . 
The other device is the use of a statistical description of stratecy 
vectors in order to provide a dimension-free con1parison between games 
with different numbers of pl ayers. This statistical treatment of 
allocations of an exchange economy is due to Hil denbrand and his 
associates, and is exposited in [7]. 
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These two devices will be combined by the use of an abstract 
representation of a game in the spirit of Debreu [2], to be called a 
pseudogame. Both strategic-form games and their statistical images 
are ex�•ples of pseudogames. The introduction of pseudogames enables 
Theorem 1, which asserts that the equilibrium correspondence of a 
topological space has a closed graph, to be stated very easily and 
proved in a transparent way. With this fact in hand, it is a routine 
matter to state sufficient conditions for the correspondence to be 
upper hemicontinuous. 
Theorem 2 will verify that the statistical image of a game is 
a faithful representation. That is, when the game and its image are 
both regarded as pseudogames, a joint probability measure on players' 
characteristics and strategies is an equilibrium of the image if and 
only if it is the statistical distribution of an equilibrium strategy 
vector of the original game. This theorem justifies the use of 
Hildenbrand's device as the basis on which to formulate Theorem 3, a 
specific version of the upper-hemicontinuity theorem for spaces of 
games in which the number of players may increase to infinity. The 
conclusion of this paper explains in detail how Theorem 3 may be 
appl ied to show the validity of Schmeidler's nonatomic codel to 
represent competitive environments as noncooperative games. 
2. S1RATEGIC-FOIUI GAMES AND PSEUDOGAMES 
The representation of noncooperativc games to be studied here 
wil l be motivated by showing its close relation to the widely used 
strategic (or normal) form of a game with finitely many players. Let 
T = {l, • • •  , n} be tile set of players. There is a set S of strategies, 
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and a strategy vector is an assignment of strategies to players. That 
is, the set V of strategy vectors is defined by V ST. 
Typically each player t has only a subset St of S available to 
him. Thus not every strategy vector in V is feasible. Rather, if 
(St)teT describe the strategies available to players in game g, then 
the set F of feasible strategy vectors in g is defined by g 
F g n s . teT t 
Each player has a strict preference relation among strategy 
vectors. The preferences of all players in game g can be described 
jointly by a relation P !;;; T x v2. The interpretation of g 
(t, v', v) 8 P is that player t strictly prefers strategy vector v' to g 
strategy vector v. (N. B. Transitivity and so forth need not be 
assum ed. ) 
Strategy vector v = ls1, • • •  , sn) is a Nash equilibrium point of 
game g if (a) v e Fg, and (b) for no player t and strategy s' e St 
would t strictly prefer to change his strategy from st to s', given 
that the other players' strategies would remain fixed. Condition (b) 
m::y be restated in terms of a correspondence which describes the 
ability of players to change strategy vectors by revising their 
choices of strategies witbin their ow1� strategy sets. Define 
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Ag!;;; T x v2 by Ag= {(t, v', v)lnt (v') e St and 
Vt' Ft nt,(v') = nt,(v)}, where nt:V � S is projection onto the t 
component. (I. e. ,  nt(v) is the strategy chosen by player t in 
strategy vector v. ) Then condition (b) may be restated as (b') 
A n P n CT x V x {v}) g g e. This completes the description of 
finite-player strategic form games. 
The sets T, S, (St) T and P are the primitive entities of a t& g 
strategic-form game. The sets V, F and A used to define Nash g g 
equil ibriuu are formed from Cartesian products of the primitive sets. 
A pseudogame will be defined by taking all of the sets and relations 
T, S, V, P , A an� F to be primitive, along with a correspondence g g g 
Jg: V  � T x S which specifies the strategies chosen by the various 
players in each strategy vector. Equilibrium will still be defined by 
(a) and (b'), but V, A , F and J need not be of the form required in g g 
strategic form. In particular, V may be something other than the 
product space ST. It will be evident that pseudogames are closely 
related to the abstract economies studied by Debreu [2]. 
There will be a minor technical departure of the precise 
definition of a pseudogame from the account just given. This 
departure is required to describe nonatomic garnes adequately because, 
if players preferences were to compare only strategy vectors defined 
on the basis of aggregate decisions and if no player is to have 
aggregate significance, then every strategy vector would necessarily 
be an equilibrium. In order to avoid this trivialization, a player' s 
preferences will be specified to compare his circumstances: 
combinations of his own strategy and the strategy vector. The 
statistical viewpoint to be taken later will also focus attention on 
the combinations of players' characteristics and strategies rather 
than on the strategies of individual players. These characteristic-
strategy combinations will be called decisions. The definitions of 
circumstance and decision are now presented and related to strategic 
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form, after which the precise definition of pseudogames will be given. 
A player's decision in a strategy vector is described by 
identifying the player and the strategy which he plays. In 
particular, the ordered pair (t, nt(v)) is the decision of player t in 
strategic-form strategy vector v. Every decision is an elecent of the 
product set T x S. This set will be denoted by D. The correspondence 
J:V � D is defined by J(v) = ((t, nt(v))l t & T) for a strategic-form 
game. 
The circumstance of a player in a strategy vector is described 
by the player's strategy and the strategy vector itself. That is, the 
ordered pair (nt(v), v) is the circumstance of player t in strategic-
form strateg y vector v. Every circumstance is an element of the 
product set S x V, which will be denoted by C. Players' preferences 
will compare circumstances rather than strategy vectors. To translate 
from the strateg ic-form to the pseudogame representation of a finite-
player game, simply say that (s' ,v') is strictly 11referred by player t 
to (s, v) in the pseudogame if aml only if v' is strictly preferred to 
v in strategic form. 
The precise definition of a pseudogame is now given. A 
pseudogan1e is defined in terms of a set T of player types, a set S of 
strategies, and a set V of strategy vectors. These sets will all be 
assumed to be topological spaces. A strategy choice by a player type 
is a decision. A strategy choice made in the context of a strategy 
vector is a circumstance. Formally, let D = T x S and C s % v 
denote the set of decisions and the set of circumstances, 
respectively. These (and other product sets to be introduced ) are 
topologized as product spaces. 
Let g be a game. Each player type in g has a preference 
relation over circumstances. The preference relations of all player 
types are jointly described by a relation P � T x CZ. The g 
interpretation of (t, c', c) £ P is that players of type t strictly g 
prefer circumstance c' to circumstance c. However, no formal 
restrictions (e. g. , that the preference relation of each type is 
transitive) are placed on P • g 
Players can change their circumstances by changing their 
decisions. Their ability to do this is described by an alternative 
correspondence A :T x C � C. That (s', v') & A (t, [s, v] ) means that, g g 
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if a single player of type t were to change his strategy choice froo s 
to s' when the strategy vector was v, that strategy vector would be 
changed to v'. A decision is inadmissable if the player making it has 
ne&lected a preferred alternative. Formally, define the inadmissible-
decision correspondence I : V  -7 D by g 
(t, s) & I (v) < = > 3c [c e A (t, [s, v] ) and (t,c, [s, v] ) & P ]. g g g 
Each strategy vector results from a combination of strategy 
choices. These are specified by a correspondence J : V  -7 D. The g 
interpretation of (t, s) e J (v) is that, in strateg y vector v, at g 
least one player of type t has chosen strateg y s. 
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(1) 
In order to cocpare several different games, we will have to 
embed their spaces of strategy vectors in a common space. Thus, for 
any particular game being considered, not every strategy vector in the 
common space V will be feasible. A subset F !=: V specifies the g 
feasible strategy vectors in game g. 
An equilibrium point is a feasible strategy vector in which no 
inadmissible decisions are made. Formally, the equilibrium set E !;;;; V g 
of game g is defined by 
v e E <=> [v e F and I (v) n J (v) g g g g 
3. TOPOLOGICAL FAMILIES OF PSEUDOGAMES 
t] . 
Consider a topological space G, the points of which are 
(2) 
pseudoga�es. Suvpose that these are all defined on the same tripl e of 
spaces T, S and V. The characterization of pseudogames in G may be 
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consolidated into a single relation P � G x T x r?- and correspondences 
F: G -7 V, A: G x T x C -7 C and J :G x V � D. Thus 
(g,t, c',c) e P <=> (t, c', c) e P , v e F(g) (=) v e F ,  and so forth. g g 
The inadmissible-decision correspondence l:G x V -7 D is define by 
(t,s) e l(g,v) < = > 3c [c e A(g,t, [s, v] ) and (g, t,c, [s, v] ) e P ] .  
The equilibrium correspondence E:G -7 V is defined by 
v e E(g) < = > [v e F(g) and l(g, v) n J(g, v) 




A topological family of pseudogames is specified by a relation 
P and correspondences F, A and J which satisfy 
P is open, 
F is closed, 
A is lower hemicontinuous, and 
J is lower hemicontinuous 
4. THE EQUILIBRIUM CORRESPONDENCE OF A TOPOLOGICAL FAMILY 





space X to subsets of the space Y. H is open or closed if its graph 
((x, yl l y £ H(x)} is open or closed, respectively. H is lower 
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hemicontinuous (l.h.c.) if £x lHCx) n U # DJ is open in X for every
open set U in Y. H is upper hecicontinuous (u.h. c. ) if £x lllCx) � U} 
is open in X for every open set U in Y and H(x) is nonempty for every 
x in X. 
In this section it will be shown that the equilibriun 
correspondence of a topological family of pseudogames is always 
closed, and a sufficient condition will be established for such a 
correspondence to be upper hemicontinuous. 
Lemma 1: Let X and Y be two arbitrary topological spaces. If 
H: X -? Y is open and K: X -? Y is 1.h.c • •  then W = £x lHCx) n K(x) F DJ 
is open. 
Proof: Suppose that x e W and that y e  H(x) n K(x). Since Il is open, 
there are neighborhoods U of x and Z of y such that U x Z � H. Since 
K is l.h.c., the set V = {v e x lKCv) n X F DJ is a neighborhood of x. 
W is open, then, because x (which is an arbitrary element of W) 
satisfies x e u n v � w. Q.E.D. 
Lemma 2: The inadmissible-decision correspondence of a topological 
family is open. 
Proof: Define H:G x T x C -? C by c' e H(g,t,c) <=> (g, t, c' ,c) £ P. 
To apply Lemma l, let K = A. By (5), (7) and Le&1ma 1, 
W = [(g,d,v)IHCg,d, v) n A(g,d,v) F DJ is open. Since 
d e I(g, v) <=> (g,d,v) £ W, I is open. Q. E. D. 
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Theorem 1: The equilibrium correspondence of a topological family is 
closed. 
Proof: It will be proved that (G x V)\E is open. Define 
W = {(g, v)I ICg.v) n J(g, v) F DJ. By (4), CG x V)\E =WU (V\F). 
Since F is closed by (6), it is sufficient to show that W is open. 
Letting H = I and K = J in Lemma 1, this is immediate by Lecma 2 and 
(8). Q. E.D. 
Corollary: If E is nonempty valued and F is u.h.c. and compact 
valued, then E is u.h.c. 
Proof: This is an immediate consequence of Theorem 1 and [7, Chapter 
1, Proposition B. 111. 2]. Q.E.D. 
Four examples are now provided which show that Theorem 1 would 
not be valid (i.e., that E might not be closed) if (5)-(8) were not 
required. In each example, T is an arbitrary space and 
G = S = V = IL Z will denote {(r, r) I r e lR}. 
F (g) 
Example 1: P is not open. Define P = {(g, t, c, [s, vl)l v = g}, 
V, A(g, t, c) = C, and J(g,v) = T x {vJ. Then E = E.2\Z. 
Example 2: F is not closed. Define P = 8, F(g) = V\{g}, 
A(g,t, c) = C and J(g,v) = T x {vJ. Then E = E.2\z.
Example 3: A is not 1.h. c. Define P = G x T x c2, F(g) = V, 
{ [cJ if gFO A(g,t, c) = , and J(g,v) = T x (v}. 
C if g=O 
Then E = E. 2 \ ( ( 0 J x lR ) • 
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Example 4: J is not l. h.c. Define P = G x T x Cl, F(g) = V, 
A(g,t,c) = C, and J(g,v) = f 8 if g -F o l Tx{v} if g = 0 Then E = E.
2\((0} x :nu. 
These pathologies can be exhibited also in topological 
families, the elements of which are derived from strategic-form games 
in which the players have rational preferences. 
s • MEASURE-THEORETIC PRELIMINARms 
Games in strategic form (also called normal form by some 
authors) with a measure space of players will be introduced in the 
next section. These include the nonatomic games of Schmeidler [12]. 
For the remainder of the paper T and S will be assumed to be complete 
separable metric spaces, as will a set N of players. Some measure-
theoretic preliminaries are now taken care of. 
E denotes the real numbers. l denotes Lebesgue measure on 
E .  
The Borel a-algebra of X is the smallest a-algebra containing 
the open sets of X. A function f:X -7 Y is Borel measurable if the 
inverse image of every Borel subset of Y is a Borel subset of X. yX
will denote the set of Borel-measurable functions from X to Y. Set 
and function quantifiers range over Borel sets and over Borel-
measurable functions, respectively. 
A Borel measure on X is a nonnecative, real-valued, countably 
additive set function on the Borel a-algebra of X. If m is a Borel 
measure on X and d is a metric on Y, then the topology on yX of
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convergence in m-measure is generated by the subbasic sets U(f,q,r), 
where f & YX, q > 0 and r > O. U(f,q,r) is defined by
Vf' & YX f' & U(f,q,r) <=> m(Cx ld(f(x),f'(x)) 2 q}) ( r.
If X is a separable metric space, then M(X) will denote the 
set of Borel measures on X. B! [4, Exercise 111.9.22], every m e Jl(X) 
is regular. I.e., for every B � X and r > 0 there exist a closed 
H � X and an open U � X such that H t; B � U and m(U) - m(H) ( r. It 
follows from [4, Theorem IV.6.2] that M(X) under the total-variation 
norm is isometrically embeddable in the dual space C•(X) of the Banach 
space of bounded, continuous, real-valued functions on X. if X is 
compact, then M(X) is isometrically isomorphic to the positive cone of 
C*(X) by [4, Theorem 111.5.13]. 
M(X) will be regarded as a subspace of C*(X) under the weak• 
topology. This topology is generated by the subbasic open sets 
W(f,q,r), where f 8 C(X), q 8 E and r > O. W(f,q,r) is defined by 
Vm e M(X) m e W(f,q,r) <=> IJxfdm - qi < r. 
Suppose that X is separable. Then it is second countable. 
I.e., it has a countable base {W1,w2, • • •  J. For m e Jl(X), define
Z(m) = fk lm(Wk) = 0}. The support of m is its image under the
correspondence supp:!l(X) -7 X defined by supp(m) = X\ n Wk. Then
kBZ(m) 
supp(m) is closed, and VB� X m(B) = m(B n supp(m)). Also, for every 
open U � X, m(U) 0 <=> u n supp(m) = e. 
If X and Y are both separable metric spaces, then the Borel 
a-algebra of X x Y is generated by product sets B x C, where B � X and 
C � Y, by [9, Chapter 1, Theorem 1.10]. Thus, by [4, Theorem 
111.11.2] , a unique measure m iu MCX it Y) is specified by tl1e 
equations m(B it C) = n(B) • p(C) (where B and C are subsets of X and 
Y, respectively) if n e M(X) and p e M(Y). 
For B � X, #B denotes the cardinality of B, and the 
characteristic function of B is denoted by XB: X  � {
0,1}. Free
variables in formal statements implicitly are universally quantified 
over their appropriate domains. E.g., v e E(g) <=> v e E 
g 
read as Vv e V l/g e G v e E(g) <=> v e E •g 
6. GAMES IN STRATF.GIC FORM WITH A MEASURE SPACE OF PLAYERS
should be 
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A strategic-form game is defined on a player space N, endowed 
with a measure n e M(N), and on a strategy space S. Strategy vectors 
are functions in SN, and are topologized by convergence in n-measure.
Players' preferences in game g are specified by an open 
relation P !; Nit (Sit SN)2• A player's own action is made ang 
explicit argument of his preference, although this is redundant (i.e., 
f(i) is the strategy of player i in strategy vector f), because the 
openness requirement would otherwise force nonatomic players to be 
indifferent to unilateral changes in their own strategies. 
Feasibility in strategic form is defined directly in terms of 
players' strategy sets (rather than in terms of strategy vectors) by a 
closed and l. h.c. correspondence F :N � S. F (i) is the set ofg g 
strategies feasible for player i. The set V of feasible strategyg 
vectors in game g is defined to be the set of selections from F g
(i.e. , strategy vectors in which almost all players are assigned 
feasible strategies). I. e., 
f e V, <=> n({i e N lfCil t F (i)}) g g o .
16 
(9) 
Proposition 1: If f e SN, then {i e N lfCi) t F (i)} is a Borel set.g 
Proof: Since F is closed and since N and S are second countable,g 
there is a sequence (Uk,Wk)k=l,2, . • such that each Uk and Wk are open
in N and S, respectively, and (Nit S)\F g
{i e N lf(i) t F (i)}g 
(D 
-1 U (Uk n f (Wk)).k=l 
(D 
U (Uk it Wk). Hence
k=l 
Q. E. D. 
Player i changes a strategy vector f by changing f(i). Rather 
than an alternative correspondence, in strategic form there is for 
each i e N an alternative function a.: S  x SN �SN, defined by
1 
f' a.(s,f) <=> [f'(i) 
1 
s and l/j � i f'(j) f( j)] • 
In strategic form, it is sufficient for the inadmissible-
(10) 
decision correspondence to specify the players who make inadmissible 
decisions in a strategy vector. because the strategy vector itself 
specifies their strategies. Define the inadmissible-decision 
N correspondence I : S  � N of game g byg 
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I (f) g Ci l3s e Fg(i) Ci.s.ai(s. f) .f(i) .f) E Pg}. (11) 
Proposition 2: I (f) is a Borel set.g 
Proof: Define N0 = Ci ln([i}) = 0}. N\N0 is countable. so it is sufficient
to prove that I
8
(f) n N0 is a Borel set. Note that. for i e N0, ai(s,f)
is in exactly the same subbasic open sets of SN as f is. Thus for all
s ES and i e N0 (i,s,a.(s,f),f(i),f) E P <= > (i,s,f,f(i) ,f) & P • • 1 g g 
because P is open. Furthermore. [(i,s,s')l(i,s, f,s'. f) e P }  is open.g g 
By second countability. this set is U (Xk x Yk x Zk) for some k=l 
sequence of open sets x1 !;;; N, Y1 !: S and z1 !: S. Define 
Wk= Ci lFg(i) n Y1 F OJ . Wk is open because Fg is l.h.c.
1gcf> n N0 £i l3s E F (i)(i,s. f,f(i). f) e p} n Nog g 
�(Wk n � n f-l(�)) n N0, which is a Borel set.k=l
Q.E. D. 
An equilibrium point of the strategic-form game g is a 
strategy vector f e V such that n(I (f)) = 0.g g 
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7. ANONYMOUS GAMES
Much of economic theory concerns g11J:1es in which the preference 
of each player depends only on his own decision and on aggregate or 
statistical information about the decisions of other players. These 
will be called anonymous games, and will be defined here as a class of 
games in strategic form. A space T of player types and a space S of 
strategies are given. There is a continuous mass-revealing function 
b:T � [0,1). The set of players is N = T x [0,1). This set is 
endowed with a measure having the property that the mass of almost 
every player is accurately described by the mass-revealing function. 
The set Q � M(!:!:) of such measures is defined by 
n e Q <= > Vi E supp(n) n([i}) = b(�(i)). (12) 
where �=N �T is projection onto T (i.e • •  �(t,r) = t). 
Let n e Q be the measure of players in anonymous game g. To 
describe the relation of players' preferences in g to aggregate 
information. the statistical distribution of a strategy vector in 
y = .JJ. is introduced. The function p:Q x y � M(D) is defined by
me p(n, f) <=> VX � T VY� S m(X x Y) = n(�-l(X) n f-l(Y)). (13) 
I.e. , p(n, f) is the statistical distribution of decisions in f 
relative to n. 
19 
A player's preference in g must depend only on his own 
strategy and on aggregate information, and his preference and strategy 
set must be functions of his type. That is, there must be a relation 
f !: T x (S x M(D))2 which satisfies
(i,s' ,f' ,s,f) e Pg <=> (T(i},s' ,µ(n,f' ),s,µ(n,f)) £ f • 
and there must be a correspondence f:T � S which satisfies 
s e F (i) {=) s e F(T(i)).g -
(14) 
(15) 
The equilibrium set E of g is defined (as for strategic-formg 
games in general) by 
f e E <=> [f e V and n(I (f)) g g g O] , 
where V and I are defined by (9) and (11), respectively.g g 
(16) 
Remark 1: An arbitrary strategic-form game h is equivalent to some
anonymous gBlile g. Suppose that the set of players in h is N, under 
Borel measure m. Define T = N x [0,1] , and define b(i,q) = q for 
i e N and q e [0, 1] . Then define the injection \,): N � N by 
l,)(i) = (i,m({i)),O) . The measure n £�defined by n(L) = m(\,)-l(B)) is 
the measure of players in g. f and f are defined in a natural way 
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from Ph and Fh, respectively, and then Pg and Fg are defined by (14) 
and (15) • This construction has the property that f e E if and onlyg 
if f 0 I,) e Eh.
This section concludes with a lemma which shows that the 
aggregate information about a strategy vector is sufficient to 
determine whether it is an equilibrium point of an anonymous game. 
Lemma 3: If µ(n, f) µ(n,f') 
Proof: Suppose that f t E . �� g 
m, then f e E <=> f' e E .g g 
By (16), either ft V or elseg 
n(I (f)) > O. It will be shown that f' shares the difficulty in 
• 
either case, so that f' t E • g 
Case 1: Assume that f t V • ��- g I.e., n({i lf(i) t F (i)}) > O. From theg 
proof of Proposition 1 there must be open sets U !:.!'.!:and W !;;;; S such that 
n(U n f-l(W)) > 0 and (U x W) n F = • • The image T(U) is open because Tg 
is a projection and U is open, and (T-l(T(U)) x W) n F g • by (15). 
Note that, by (13), m(T(U) x W) = n(T-l(T(U)) n f-l(W}) L n(U n f-l(W)) ) 0. 
-1 -1 Also m(T(U) x W) = n(T (T(U)) n f' (W)) by assumption, so 
n(fi lf'(i) t F (i))) 2 m(T(U) x W) > 0 and therefore f' t V g g
Case 2: Assume that n(I (f)) > 0 Suppose first that there is ag 
player i e Ig(f) such that n(i) ) O. Then, by (13),
m((•(i)) x (f(i))) 2 n((i)) ) O. Thus, by (14) and (lS), 
n(I (f')) 2 n(•-l(•(i)) n f'-l(f(i))) g m((•(i)) x (f(i))) ) O.
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If there is no such player i, then the proof of Proposition 2 
shows that there are open sets CW n X) !;;N and Z !!;; S such that 
-1 -1 n(W n X n f (Z)) > 0 and W n X n f CZ) !!;; Ig(f). By an argument
analogous to Case 1, n(W n X n f'-l(Z)) > 0 and
W n X n f'-l(Z) !!;; I (f' ) as well.
8 
This argument has shown that, under the hypothesis of the 
lemma, f 8 E =) f' e E . Since f and f' are interchangeable in theg g 
statement of the lemma, the converse implication holds as well. 
Q.E. D. 
8. VARIATION OF THE PLAYERS OF A GAME 
On a type space T (with continuous mass-revealing function b) 
and a strategy space S, consider a preference relation 
f � T x (S x M(D))2 and a feasible-strategy correspondence .f: T -? S.
The pair (f,f) will be called an anonymous game form if it satisfies 
f is open, and (17) 
Eis closed and l.h.c. ( 18) 
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For any measure in Q, f and E will determine an anonymous strategic-
form game in a natural way. Thus an anonymous game form can serve as 
a basis for studying the type of question that was described in the 
Introduction. 
Proposition 3: Let (f,_E) be an anonymous game form, and let n e Q. 
Then there is an anonymous game g having n as the masure of its 
players, and of which the preference relation P and the feasible­g 
strategy correspondence F are defined by (14) and (lS), respectively.g 
Proof: It must be shown that P is open, and that F is closed and�� g g 
l.h.c. 
To show that P
8 
is open, define n:N x (S x y> 2 -? T x (S x MCD))2
by n(i,s',f' ,s,f) = (•(i),s' ,µ(n,f' ),s,µ(n,f)). It will be proved 
below, as Lemma 4, that µ is continuous in f when y has the topology 
of convergence in n-measure. By (14), P = n-
1CP). This inverseg -
image is open by (17), Lemma 4, and the continuity of •· 
To show that F is closed, define &:N x S -? T x S byg -
&(i,s) = (•(i),s). F = &-1CF) by (lS), and this inverse image isg -
closed by (18) and the continuity of &. 
If U is open in S, then {i lF (i) n U # 0} g .-
1C£t lECt> n U #OJ> .
which is open by (18) and continuity of •· Thus F is l.h.c. g Q.E. D. 
Lemma 4: Let n e §, and topologize Y by convergence in n-measure. 
Then µ (n, f) is continuous as a function of f. 
Proof: Y is metrizable by [4, Lemma III. 2. 7], so sequential 
continuity implies continuity of µ with respect to f. Sequential 
continuity follows from [4, Corollary III. 6.13] (Convergence in 
measure implies convergence almost everywhere) and [4, Corollary 
III. 6. 16] (Lebesgue's dominated convergence theorem). Q. E. D. 
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Remark 2: Proposition 3 formalizes the idea that the rules of a game 
may be defined without specifying the set of players (i. e. , the 
support of n) or even the number of players who will participate. 
Such institutions as elections and auctions fit this description. 
There is an evident analogy between an anonymous game form (in 
strategic form) and a topological family of pseudogames. The 
equilibrium correspondence of an anonymous game form would map Q to y. 
This correspondence cannot directly be characterized topologically 
because Y is topologized in a way which depends on the measure n e Q 
of players. However, it is possible to study a correspondence which 
assigns µ((n} x E ) to n, where g is the pseudogame determined by (14) g 
and (15). Lemma 3 has shown that this correspondence completely 
determines the equilibrium correspondence of (f,f). This determining 
correspondence will now be shown to be the equilibrium correspondence 
of a topological family derived from (f,f). 
9. mE STATISTICAL IMAGE OF AN ANONYMOUS GAME FORM 
The statistical image of an anonymous game form (f,f) is a 
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topological family of pseudogames (G, T, S, V, P, F, A,J). T and S are the 
type and strategy spaces of (f,f). G is the set of measures in lf(T) 
which are the distribution of� for some measure in Q. I. e. , G is the 
set of g e M(T) which satisfy 
\fB � T g(B) -1 n(� (B)) (19) 
for some n e §. V is the set of distributions of decisions in 
strategy vectors of games in (f,f). I. e. ,  V � M(D) is the image of 
Q x y under µ. P, F, A, and J are defined by 
(g, t, c', c) e P <=> (t, c', c) e f,
v e F(g) <=> [supp (v) !;;; .E and \fB !;;; T v(B x S)
(g, t, [s', v'], [s, v] ) e A< => [(t, s') £ .E and 
g (B)] , 
llB !; D v' (B) v(B) + b (t)CX8(t, s') - XB(t, s))] , 
and 






Proposition 4: The statistical image of an anonymous game form is a 
topological family. 
Conditions (S)-(8) must be verified to prove Proposition 4. 
This verification requires some knowledge about open sets in ll(D), 
which is now given in Lemma S. For X a separable metric space, U open 
in X and r s JR., define W+(U,r) = {ms M(X)lmCU) > r} and 
W-(U, r) = {m B M(X)lmCcl(U)) < r}. 
Lemma S: The sets W+(U,r) and W-(U,r) are open in M(X). 
Proof: To show that W+(U,r) is open, suppose that m B W+(U, r). A 
subbasic open set W(f,q,q' ) will be found such that 
m B W(f,q,q' ) !;; W+(U,r). Since X is a separable metric space, there 
exist closed sets � ��!: • • •  such that U � = U. By Urysohn' s
k=l 
lemma {4, Theorem l.S.2], for each k there is a continuous function 
fk:X -7 lR such that X� � fk � A!U. By Lebesque's dominated
convergence theorem [4, Corollary 111.6.16], fxfkdm.) r for some k.
Then ms W(fk, fxfkdm' fxfkdm - r) t: W+(U,r).
Suppose now that me W-(U,r). Define q =Cr - m(cl(U)))/2.
+ -Then me W(A!1, mCX),q) n W (X\cl(U),m(X\cl(U)) - q) � W (U,r).
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 4: P = G x �by (20). This is open in 
G x T x c2 by (17), so (S) holds.
To verify (6), it must be shown that if v A F(g), then some 
neighborhood of (g, v) in G x V is disjoint from F (i.e., from the 
graph of F). By (21), F = {(g',v') e G x Vlsupp(v' ) !;.f} n 
[ n {(g',v' ) e G x Vlv'(B x S) = g'(B)}]. 
Bg' 
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First suppose that supp(v) {;.f. Then D\.f is open by (18) and 
v(D\,f) > 0, so (G x W+(D\,f,O)) n F = 8.
Second, suppose that v(B x S) F g(B). To begin, suppose that 
vCB x S) > g(B). By regularity of g, there is an open U !:; T with 
B � U and g(U) < v(B x S) � v(U x S). Since T is a separable metric 
space, there is a closed H !: U such that g(U) < v(H x S). By Urysohn' s 
lemma, there is a continuous f:T -7 lR with X
H � f � XU. Defino
f':D -7 lR by f'(t,s) = f(t), and define r > 0 by r = <fnf'dv - fTfdg)/2.
Then (g,v) e W(f,fTfdg,r) x W(f' ,fDf'dv,r) !;; (M(T) x M(D))\F,
since fTfdg = fDf'dv if v e F(g).
Alternatively, suppose that v(B x S) < g(B). Then either 
v((T\B) x S) ) g(T\B) (in which case it has just been shown that 
(g,v) � cl(F)), or else v(D) < g(T) (in which case 
W+(T,(g(T) + v(D))/2) x W
-(D,(g(T) + v(D))/2) n F = f). Thus
(g,v) i cl(F) if v(B x S) F g(B), establishing (6). 
Now it will be shown that A is l.h.c. Suppose that U' � S is 
open, that W(f,q, r) � M(D), and that (s' ,v') e A(g, t,[s,v]) n (U' x W(f,q,r)). 
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Assume without loss of generality that JDfdv' = q. Note that
s' 8 f(t) by (22). If 1u = {x e TIECx) n u# 8) for u !;;;; U' open, then
1u is open by (18). For x e 1u• u e U, ye S and me W(v,Jnfdv,r/2),
lrJDfdm + b(x)(f(x,u) - f(x,y))] - Jnfdv'I
i r/2 + lb(x)(f(x,u) - f(x,y)) - b(t)(f(t,s') - f(t,sl)I. (24) 
Neighborhoods U !: U' of s', X !: 1u of t and Y !: S of y can be chosen
so that the right hand side of (24) is less than r on 
W(v,JDfdv,r/2) x X x  U x Y, by continuity of b and f. Thus, for any
(gO,t0,50,v•) e G xx x y x (W(v,Jnfdv,r/2) n V), 
A(g0,t0,s0,v0) n (U' x W(f,q,r)) = 8. I.e., (7) holds. 
To show that J is l.h.c., let U !;;;; D be open and suppose that 
de J(g,v) n U. Since de supp(v), v(U) > 0, so v e W+(U,0). Also, 
if m(U) > 0 for any m e JHD), then supp(m) n U # 8. Thus 
G x (W+(U,0) n V) !;;;; {(g',v')IFCg',v') n U # 8}, so (8) is established. 
Q.E.D. 
If n E .!! and g e G are related by (19), then g is naturally 
associated with the game in (f,f) determined by n. The equivalence 
between the equilibria of these two pseudogames will be proved as 
Theorem 2. The proof requires several lemmas. 
Lemma 6: If g e G, then there are measures g0 and g1 in )l(T) such 
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that (i) g0 is nonatomic and supp(g0) � b-
1
({0}), (ii) there is a
sequence (possibly with repetitions) t1,t2, • • •  in T such that, for all
co 
B c T, g1CB) [b(tk)XB(tk)' and (iii) gk=l 
go+ gl
.
Proof: Since g e G, there is a measure n e .!! such that n and g 
satisfy (19). By (12), n has no atoms in b-
1
({0}) x [0,1], and
supp(n) n b-l((0,1]) is a countable set. Let i1,i2, • • •  be an
enumeration of this set. For all k, n({ik}) = b(�(ik)). Define
tk = �(ik) and let g1 be defined by (ii). Define g0 = g - g1, so that 
( i) and (iii) hold. Q.E.D. 
Lemma 7: If v e V, then there are measures v0 and v1 in M(D) such 
that (i) v0 is nonatomic and supp(v0) !;;;; b-
1
({0}) x S, (ii) there is a
sequence (possibly with repetitions) d1,d2, • • •  in D such that, if
dk (tk,sk), VB� D v1(B) 
co [ b(tk)XB(dk), and (iii) v = v0 + v1 •IC=l 
Proof: Let v = µ(n,f), and let i1,i2, • • •  be the atoms of n. Define
tk = �(ik) and sk = f(ik). Then v1 is defined by (ii), and (i) and 
(iii) are satisfied by v0 v - v1. Q.E.D. 
Lemma 8: If v e F(g), then there exist n E .§and f e .Y such that (i) 
n an<l g satisfy (19), and (ii) v = µ(n,f). In fact, a function f 
satisfying (ii) exists for .!!!I: n satisfying (i). 
Proof: If t1, t2, • • •  is the sequence described in Lemma 6, then by
(21) there must be s1, s2, • • •  such that Ct1, s1), Ct2, s2), • • •  is the
sequence described in Le1:1111a 7. Define � e M(_N) by
CD 
lfB !;;; N � (B) = [ b(tlt)XB(t:t.'1/lt). Define no e M(_N) bylt=l 
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lfX !;;;; T lfY !;;;; [0,1) n0CX x Y) = g0(X) 
• A(Y), where s0 is as in Lemma 6. 
Then n = n0 - �satisfies (i). To define f, first set
fCt1,1/lt) = sit. Second, define a function h:N � S such that
v0 = p(n0, h) by the method used in the proof of [7, Proposition 
11.2.2.6) (originally proved by Hart, Hildenbrand and Kohlberg [6] to 
assign an allocation to a distribution), and set f =h on b-1({0}). 
Now f has been defined everywhere on supp(n), so (ii) is satisfied 
regardless of what value it is assigned elsewhere. 
This construction of f works for any n e Q such that n and g 
satisfy (19). In particular, the proof appealed to in [6) requires 
only that n0 be a nonatomic measure on J:i, although it is stated only 
for n0 = Bo A. However, the assumption that T and S are complete 
metric spaces is required in order for that proof to be applied. 
Q.E.D. 
Lemma 9: If n and g satisfy (19), (s', v') e A(g, t, [s, v]), v = p(n, f), 
and t e supp (g), then there exists a player i e ,-l(t) for whoc 
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v' p(n, ai (s' , f)). 
Proof: This follows from (10), (22) and (12). Q.E.D. 
Remark 3: Crucial use has been made here of condition (12) defining 
Q. It has been necessary to define A in terms of the mass-revealing 
function b in order to assure lower hemicontinuity. Lemma 9 holds 
because (12) guarantees that this definition will be appropriate for 
almost all players. 
Theorem 2: If v e V, n and g satisfy (19), E is defined by (16) for g 
the game in (�,f) in which n is the measure of players, and E(g) is 





v e E(g) 
3f e V [f e E and v = p(n, f)] - g 
\ff e V [p(n, f) = v => f e E ]. - g 
Proof: That (i) and (ii) are equivalent is a consequence of Lemma 8, 
and of a comparison of (4) and (16) using Lemma 9. That (ii) and 
(iii) are equivalent follows from Lemma 3 and Lemma 8. Q.E.D. 
10. THE F.QUILIBRIUM CORRESPONDENCE OF AN ANONYMOUS GAME FORM
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By the equilibrillm correspondence of an anonymous game form is 
meant the equilibrium correspondence of its statistical image. The 
graph of this correspondence is now studied as a subset of 
M(T) lC ll(D). The first step is to describe G as a subset of M(T) and 
V as a subset of M(D). 
Lemma 10: The measure g e M(T) is in G if and only if Vt e supp(g) 
[b(t) > 0 => g({t))/b(t) is a strictly positive integer]. The measure 
v e M(D) is in V if and only if V(t,s) e supp(v) 
[b(t) > 0 => v({(t,s)})/b(t) is a strictly positive integer]. 
Proof: Suppose that Vt e supp(g) [b(t) > 0 => g((t))/b(t) is a 
strictly positive integer]. Then there is an enllmeration (possibly 
with repetitions) tl,t2···· of b
-1CCO,l]) n supp(g) such that, for all
-1 I t 8 b ((0,1]), #(k t =  tk)
CD 
g (ft)) /b (t). Define Di e MU!) by 
� (X) [ b(tk)�(tk,1/k). k=l 
-1 Define g0 e M(T) by g0(B) = g(B 0 h (fO))),
define n0 e M(�) by VX !;;;; T VY!;;;; [0,1] n0(X lC Y) = g0(X) • l(Y), and
define n = n0 + �· Then n e Q, and n and g satisfy ( 19), so g e G. 
The converse implication follows from Lemma 6. 
The proof of the equivalence for v e M(D) is analogous, using 
Lemma 7 and Lemma 8 • Q.E.D. 
Lemma 11: G is closed in M(T). V is closed in M(D). 
Proof: Suppose that m e ll(T)\G. By Lemma 10, for some 
-1 t e b ((0,1]) n supp(m), either m(t) = 0 or else
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k < m({t))/b(t) < k + 1 for some integer 
k. If m({t)) 0, then there
is a neighborhood U of t such that m(cl(U)) < inf{b(ullu e U) = r, by 
continuity of b, regularity of m and normality of T [4, Theorem 
1.6.3]. Thus W+(U,0) n W-(U,r) is a neighborhood of m disjoint from 
G, by Lemma 10. 
Alternatively, suppose that k < m((t})/b(t) < k + 1. Then 
there are real nllmbers q < b(t) < r such that kr < m({t}) < (k + l)q. 
There is a neighborhood U of t with U £ b-l((q,r)) and
m(cl(U)) < (k + l)q. Then W+(U,kr) n W-(U,(k + l)q) is a neighborhood
of m disjoint from G, by Lemma 10. 
The proof that V is closed in M(D) is analogous. Q.E.D. 
Theorem 3: The equilibrillm correspondence of an anonymous game form 
is closed in M(T) lC M(D). If E is nonempty valued, T is compact and .E
is u.h.c. and compact valued, then E is upper hemicontinuous as a 
correspondence from G to V. 
Proof: The first assertion is immediate �rom Theorem 1, Theorem 2 and 
Lemma 11. The second assertion will be derived from the corollary of 
Theorem 1. 
It may be assumed without loss of generality that S = f'.(T).
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By [6. Chapter 1, Proposition B.111.3]. S is then compact. Thus ll(D) 
is the positive cone of C•(D), and hence is closed in C•(D). Since 
every measure in F(g) has the same total variation as g does, F is 
compact valued by Alaoglu's theorem [4, Corollary V. 4.3]. 
It remains to be shown that F is u.h.c. By [6, Chapter 1, 
Theorem B.111.1], it is sufficient to show that if g1,g2, • • .  is any
sequence in G which converges to a measure g in G, and if v1,v2 • • • •  is
any sequence in V such that vk e F(gk) for all k, then there is a
strategy vector v a R(g) such that a subsequence of v1,v2, • • •
converges to v. For sufficiently large k, vk(D) < g(T) + 1. Thus. by
Alaoglu's theorem. the tail of the sequence v1,v2, • • •  lies in a
compact subset of M(D). so a subsequence converges to a measure 
v a M(D). By Lemma 11, v e V. By Theorem 2, v e F(g). 
The upper hemicontinuity of E now follows from the corollary 
of Theorem 1. O.E.D. 
11. CONCLUSION: APPLICATION TO MAmEMATICAL ECONOMICS
Most of the institutions studied in economics are anonymous in 
character, and can be modeled as anonymous game forms. Often these 
institutions are not incentive cocpatible when they are populated by 
few agents, but they become so (i.e., their noncooperative equilibria 
achieve co�petitive allocations) asymptotically as the number of 
agents increases. This phenomenon has been studied by considering 
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sequences n1,�···· of probability measures, such that each� has 
finite support � and #Hk � m, in the space Q of an anonymous game 
form. The sequences which reflect the effects of the presence of many 
players, rather than of the change of players' types, are those which 
converge in the sense that they are uniformly tight [9, Chapter 2, 
Theorem 6.7] and that, for every neighborhood U !;;;; T, _l" XU(T(i))/�
1
�k 
converges. Given a sequence f1,f2, • • •  in y, such that fk is an
equilibrium of the game with player space �· it may be asked (cf. 
[10]) whether the allocations resulting from these strategy vectors in 
their respective games are asymptotically competitive. 
An alternative method of study has been developed in [3] and 
in [S]. Rather than studying the sequences just described directly, 
this method involves studying the equilibrium sets E(g) where 
supp(g) � b-
1
({0}) in the statistical image of the anonymous game
form. These measures g correspond via (19) to nonatomic measures in 
Q, among which the limits of the sequences �·�···· must lie. (N.B. 
limits are defined in terms of the measures gk a G associated with � 
by (19). since Q itself is not closed. A limit in this sense must 
exist by [9. Chapter 1, Theorem 6.1, Theo�em 6.7].) 
Theorem 3 is used to infer the asymptotic competitiveness of 
the equilibrium outcomes of sequences of finite-player games, if all 
equilibrium allocations of nonatomic games in the anonymous game form 
are exactly competitive. This approach is convenient because (i) it 
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removes the necessity to make explicit approximations, and (ii) the 
nontomicity of the player spaces dealt with can be exploited as in 
Proposition 2 here. However, it sacrifices the quantitative estimates 
of the divergence of finite-player noncooperative outcomes from 
competitive allocations which the direct approach provides. 
* 
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